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Abstract  
 
In 2005, against the background of increased internal as well as external violence in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Chief Islamic Justice of the Palestinian Authority 
made a public intervention against ‘murder as revenge or in defence of honour’. This 
article considers the intervention in light of the jurisprudential, legislative and social 
arguments it invokes, and examines both commonalities and differences in the Qadi 
al-Qudah’s discourse and the position taken by women’s rights activists on this 
particular form of violence against women. 
 
 In March 2005, after a report in the West Bank press of a girl killed by her 
brother after being raped by her father, the Palestinian Qadi al-Qudah (Chief Islamic 
Justice) issued a press statement on incest and murder for ‘honour’, which opened as 
follows:  
Recent news reports have told of the twofold crime against an innocent 
girl, who was a victim of incest from her father and of honour-motivated 
murder by her brother, adding to the stories of these vile and ghastly 
crimes that are reported from time to time. I am absolutely certain that this 
girl fell through the effect of her father’s power into a crime in which she 
was guiltless, so she was murdered twice. […] As for he who appoints 
himself ruler and judge and executor of punishment, he is corrupt on the 
earth (mufsid fi’l-`ard) even if he was motivated to take vengeance (tha’r) 
or revenge (intiqam) for honour.1 
 A week or so later, in his regular Friday column in the local newspaper, 
Shaykh Taysir al-Tamimi expanded this original statement in an intervention 
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 Statement on the ruling (bayan al-hukm) in the crimes of incest and  murder for honour, by the 
Qadi al-Qudah of Palestine, Shaykh Taysir Rajab al-Tamimi, Diwan of the Qadi al-Qudah, Jerusalem, 
23rd March 2005. 
 2 
addressing murder for revenge (tha’r) and for ‘honour.’ This intervention, translated 
later in this article, illustrates a number of commonalities and differences between the 
leading figure in the Palestinian shar`i judiciary and rights activists, particularly in 
human rights and women’s rights organisations, in their approach to issues of 
‘honour-based’ violence against women. The Chief Islamic Justice is not the only 
prominent figure in the Palestinian shar`i establishment to intervene in the context of 
cases of violence against women in recent years. Given that criminal law in Gaza and 
the West Bank does not fall under shar`i jurisdiction, a number of issues are raised in 
a consideration of such interventions. What is the apparent intent and impact of the 
Islamic law commentary and/or findings on these and other cases? How does the 
discourse address particular actors, the central authorities, wider society? How does it 
envisage the protection of women against violence, and what are the parameters of 
that protection?  What precedents are selected to underpin the interventions? How do 
the interventions address the role of the state in protecting women against violence, 
and how do they deal with ‘lawful’ violence to be exercised by the state?  Before 
considering the particular intervention, however, a few preliminary contextual points 
are in order. 
 
Context 
In the spring of 2005, it was becoming clear that the forms of ‘internal violence’ 
considered by Shaykh Tamimi’s intervention had increased after the outbreak of the 
second uprising in 2000 and the intensely violent response by the Israeli armed forces. 
The Occupied Palestinian Territories remained under different forms of siege and 
blockade; there was a severe economic crisis (which of course has deepened since 
then with the withdrawal of development aid from Western state donors following the 
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2006 victory of Hamas in the elections for the Legislative Council); and the reach of 
the central authority, and that of its legal and executive organs (including the 
debilitated police) was enfeebled and weak. 2  This was the period that Gaza’s largest 
human rights organisation, the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, started issuing 
press releases and interventions under the general heading of ‘security chaos and 
proliferation of small arms.’ 3 There was mounting public concern at what was termed 
al-falatan al-amni, the breakdown of public security manifested by, inter alia, 
assassinations and armed clashes between different agencies of the security forces as 
well as between official security forces and the armed wings of political factions (or 
those claiming such affiliations),4 along with reports of ‘vigilante’ activities. There 
was also a more generalised use of arms in the course of private and inter-familial 
disputes, often with the invocation of the concept of tha’r or private vengeance. 
Along with this, there was substantial concern at a reported rise in domestic violence, 
linked by researchers to the ongoing conflict situation, in particular the increased 
violence against Palestinians by the Israeli army; as elsewhere in the world, externally 
imposed violence substantially increased the vulnerability of Palestinian women and 
children to violence at home.5 From the beginning of 2005, the Palestinian press 
reported a series of alleged ‘honour killings’ against young women in the West Bank. 
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 For an overview of the situation in the West Bank from the previous summer, see International Crisis 
Group (2004). Particular attention is paid in this report to difference between different areas of the 
West Bank. For an analysis of the challenges facing the Palestinian judicial system, see Naser al-Rayes,  
(2000, 2003) Al-Quda’ fi filastin wa mu`awaqat tatawwurihi, Ramallah: al-Haq 
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 See www.pchr.org.  
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 Again, this had considerably worsened by the winter of 2006-2007. 
5
 See ‘NGO Alternative pre-sessional report on Israel’s implementation of the United Nations 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in the 
Occupied Territories.’ Submitted to the pre-sessional working group of CEDAW, January 2005. 
Researched by al-Haq, PCHR and WCLAC. Compiled by Joyce Song (WCLAC) 2005. See also report 
by Yakin Erturk, UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, 
‘Report on Mission to Occupied Palestinian Territory,’ E/CN.4/2005/72/Add.4 2 February 2005. In 
2006, the Palestinian Authority’s Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) made available preliminary 
findings from a major survey on the incidence of domestic violence in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, ‘the first one of its kind on the national level’.  Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
(2006) ‘Domestic Violence Survey (December 2005-January 2006). Main Findings Report.’ Ramallah: 
June, 2006. [retrieved 14th August 2006 from http://www.pcbs.gov.ps]. 
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The statement of the Chief Islamic Justice discussed in this article was one of a 
number of public responses provoked by alarm at these circumstances. In May 2005, 
Palestinian human rights organisations in Gaza, along with a range of political 
factions, highlighted serious concerns over the ‘continuation of the state of security 
disorder’ and the numbers of casualties from ‘internal violence.’6 In the West Bank, in 
the context of similar protests over al-falatan al-amni, women’s organisations joined 
by other civil society institutions, religious leaders and political factions condemned 
the ‘femicides’ taking place from the beginning of the year, with women killed by 
relatives on alleged pretexts of ‘family honour.’7.  
The subject of ‘honour killing’ has been an increasing focus, both of domestic 
attention in different countries of the Middle East and of international attention in 
recent years.8 Local organisations and activists in Palestine, as in Jordan, Lebanon and 
Egypt, have been actively engaged with the phenomenon, working on legislative and 
policy responses and seeking the establishment of refuges and shelters for women at 
risk.9 They have also called on religious leaders (Christian and Muslim) to make 
public statements on the absence of religious endorsement of violence in the name of 
‘honour.’10  International human rights organisations – notably Amnesty International 
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 Al-Quds 11 April 2005 and 1 May 2005. 
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 For example al-Quds 4 April 2005 and 12 May 2005. 
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 See generally ‘Introduction: Honour, Rights and Wrongs’ in Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain (eds), 
‘Honour’: crimes, paradigms and violence against women (London: Zed Books 2005). An annotated 
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9
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Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, ‘Researching women’s victimisation in Palestine: a socio-legal analysis’;   
Reem Abu Hassan and Lynn Welchman, ‘Changing the rules? Developments on ‘crimes of honour’ in 
Jordan’; Aida Touma-Sliman, ‘Culture, national minority and the state: working against the ‘crime of 
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work against ‘crimes of honour’ for years prior to their contribution of case studies to this volume of 
papers. The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group dedicated an issue of its bi-monthly Monitor 
to the subject of ‘Killing of women on the basis of family honour’ (Volume 6 issue 4, August 2002). 
10
 At a meeting convened by the Coalition of Civil Society Organisations Against Violence Against 
Women in Ramallah on 7 May 2005, there were statements from representations of the Chief Islamic 
Justice and the Greek Orthodox Patriarch. Against the background of a number of ‘honour killings’ 
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and Human Rights Watch – have investigated ‘honour crimes’ in the general context 
of violence against women in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.11  
On the international level, ‘honour killings’ are problematically associated 
with, variously, Muslim communities, Arabs, ‘the East’ and so on. This is problematic 
on a number of levels, not least because it involves the ‘othering’ and ‘scandalising’ 
(if not ‘exoticising’) of certain forms of violence against women largely to the 
exclusion or at least obscuring of other forms of violence against women both in 
Western societies and in those ‘other’ societies by the West, including the violence of 
war.12 It is also the case that the way in which those in the powerful West seek to 
engage with this issue can and at times has considerably complicated the strategies of 
response formulated and implemented locally by domestic actors, notably women’s 
rights groups. For example, Muslim state representatives at the United Nations have 
taken exception to what they consider to be a projected link between Islam and 
‘honour violence’, while the profile of a Western-funded women’s rights agenda is 
used to attack local activists as going against their own society and allying themselves 
with a hostile West that is elsewhere in the region militarily engaged in Muslim 
majority states. These and other factors are part of the context in which local activists 
work. There are also problems with using the term ‘honour killing’ or ‘honour crime’ 
not least because this takes the claimed perspective of the perpetrator and may also act 
to obscure ‘real’ motivations for an act of violence – which may for example be 
                                                                                                                                            
over the previous months in the West Bank, the immediate context was the family murder of a young 
Christian woman in Ramallah. 
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 Amnesty International, ‘Israel and the Occupied Territories: Conflict, occupation and patriarchy; 
women carry the burden,’ AI Index MDE 15/016/2005 (March 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘A 
Question of Security: Violence Against Palestinian Women and Girls’ November 2006 Vol.18 No.7 
(E). The former was better received locally than the latter. 
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 See generally Welchman and Hossain (supra note 8). 
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economic. Definitions are thus particularly fraught, and some women’s groups in the 
region and elsewhere prefer use of a term that translates more as ‘femicide’.13   
 
‘Honour’ killings and the law 
Despite the problems, the terms ‘honour killings’ or ‘honour crimes’ (jara’im 
al-sharaf) are widely recognised and used in Palestine as well as in neighbouring 
countries, broadly referring to what Lama Abu Odeh terms the ‘paradigmatic example 
of a crime of honour’ – that is ‘the killing of a woman by her father or brother for 
engaging in, or being suspected of engaging in, sexual practices before or outside 
marriage.’14 In the posited paradigm, we have a set of possible crimes under classical 
Islamic law, and the invocation of a set of acts of lawful or unlawful violence. We 
have the alleged or suspected ‘sexual offence’, the commission of the hadd offence of 
zina (sexual relations outside marriage); we have the act of murder; and we have 
invocation of the violence of the state vis-à-vis the alleged act of zina, hence the issue 
of the hadd penalties, and vis-à-vis the act of murder and the issue of the lawfulness 
in these circumstances of qisas (‘exact retaliation’ or talion) and diya (financial 
compensation or ‘blood wit’). Also, in regard to the crimes of zina and of killing, we 
have the issue of ta`zir, the ‘discretionary’ penalty that may be imposed by the state 
for such offences, should they not give rise to liability under the rules of hadd or 
qisas. 
In other words, we are potentially concerned here with all three categories of 
offences broadly defined in Islamic criminal law, categorised according to the type of 
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 See, in particular regard to Palestine, Shalhoub-Kevorkian supra note 9; ‘Femicide and the 
Palestinian Criminal Justice System: Seeds of Change in the Context of State Building?’ 36/3 Law and 
Society Review; and  (2000) ‘Mapping and Analysing the Landscape of Femicide in Palestine,’ research 
report submitted to UNIFEM by the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling, Jerusalem. 
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 Lama Abu-Odeh, ‘Crimes of Honour and the Construction of Gender in Arab Societies’ in Mai 
Yamani (ed.), Feminism and Islam (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1996). 
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penalty the offences incur:  hudud, qisas and ta`zir.15 It is not the purpose of my 
commentary here to set out the arguments as to why ‘honour killings’ – in the sense 
just given – are neither lawful nor excusable under the terms of ‘classical’ Islamic 
law. Indeed, much of the intervention by the Chief Islamic Justice translated below 
goes to setting out these arguments. The intervention also criticises particular aspects 
of statutory criminal law that currently govern killings for ‘honour’ in the Palestinian 
West Bank, where the cases that provoked his response occurred. Years of work on a 
draft Palestinian Penal Code have yet (as of spring 2007) to result in legislation, so for 
the moment the terms of the 1960 Jordanian Penal Code continue to apply, including 
those contained in article 340:  
1.   He who surprises his wife or one of his close female relatives 
[mahrams]16 in the act of committing unlawful sexual intercourse with 
somebody and kills, wounds or injures one or both of them, shall be 
exempted from penalty;17  
2.   He who surprises his wife or one of his ascendants or descendants or 
siblings with another in an unlawful bed, and kills or wounds or injures 
one or both of them, shall have a reduced penalty.18  
As Lama Abu Odeh has shown, similar (if not identical) provisions appeared 
in the original texts of the penal codes of a number of other post-colonial Arab states, 
including Syria, Lebanon and Iraq.19  These articles provided the man who killed his 
wife or female relative on finding them in the act of unlawful sex with an absolute 
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 For a recent narrative of the ‘classical’ doctrine, see Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in 
Islamic Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 6-68. 
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 The term mahram denotes a person related to another person in such a degree that they would be 
prohibited from marrying each other.  
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 Literally, ‘shall benefit from the excuse of exoneration/exemption’ (`udhr muhill). See Abu Hassan 
and Welchman, supra note 9, 201. 
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 Literally, ‘shall benefit from the excuse of reduction’ or mitigation (`udhr mukhaffaf). Loc cit.  
19
 For the translations of these and other relevant provisions, see www.soas.ac.uk/honourcrimes. 
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defence and rendered him not liable to any penalty for killing in these circumstances. 
Such provisions have become the target of advocacy on the part of women’s rights 
(and human rights) activists in different countries; in Lebanon, the relic of the original 
provisions is a target for repeal now by advocacy campaigns, while the high profile 
Jordanian campaign to amend article 340 led in 2001 to a reduced penalty rather than 
no liability.20 In Palestine, advocacy continues against the inclusion of any form of 
this provision in a Palestinian penal code.21 The advocacy insists on the removal of 
such provisions because they represent the state’s gender-based sanction of violence 
by men against women in certain circumstances. However, the advocacy does not 
ignore the fact that in practice, these provisions do not describe the ‘paradigmatic’ 
circumstances of an ‘honour killing’ and are not relied upon as defence by 
perpetrators. Rather, an assortment of provisions going to a defence of provocation 
are relied on in different countries to reduce the liability of a man22 who kills his wife 
or female relative because of her actual or alleged sexual activities outside marriage. 
Under the Jordanian Penal Code in force in the Palestinian West Bank, the key 
provision here is article 98, which provides that: 
Whosoever commits a crime in a state of extreme rage resulting from an 
unrightful and dangerous act on the part of the victim shall benefit from 
mitigation. 
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 On the Jordanian amendments of 2001 see Abu Hassan and Welchman, supra note 9. The 
amendments were issued by the King and Cabinet as ‘temporary’ legislation while parliament was 
dissolved. Article 94(1) of the Jordanian constitution requires that such temporary legislation be 
reviewed by Parliament when it re-convenes. The parliament must repeal such temporary legislation if 
it is no longer to be valid. In the summer of 2003 these amendments to the Penal Code were twice 
rejected by the House of Deputies, having been accepted by the Senate; their future is thus not yet 
settled. For a political science analysis of the civil society movement against ‘honour crimes’ in Jordan, 
see Stefanie Nanes, ‘Fighting honor crimes: evidence of civil society in Jordan,’ Middle East Journal 
57/1 (2003): 112-129. 
21
 Recommendations regarding the issues of women’s rights – and particularly violence against women 
– in the light of the draft Palestinian Penal Code are collected in WCLAC (Women’s Centre for Legal 
Aid and Counselling), Wada`iyat al-mar’a al-filastiniya fi zill mashru` qanun al-`uqubat (Jerusalem: 
WCLAC, 2005). 
22
 Or sometimes a male relative who is legally a minor, further reducing criminal liability. 
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Judicial interpretation here concentrates on the terms ‘extreme rage’, 
‘unrightful’ and ‘dangerous’. 23 The element of ‘honour’ is not mentioned in the 
statute but is added in by social and judicial practice. On the other hand, the terms of 
article 340 become attached to the symbolism of ‘honour’ despite the fact that the 
article does not apply in law or in practice to the cases of ‘honour crimes’ that come 
to the attention of the authorities, such as the case cited at the beginning of this article.   
The intervention of the Palestinian Qadi al-Qudah resonates both with the 
rulings of ‘classical’ Islamic law and with the advocacy of civil society activists in 
regard to the current statutory defences available to perpetrators of ‘honour’ killings. 
In order to set the document in context, it is useful to note a few pertinent aspects of 
the way in which both Islamic criminal law and current statutory law appear to have 
developed in relation to this issue. 
 
Classical Islamic jurisprudence 
To begin with Islamic criminal law, in the texts of the classical jurists, we find 
some discussion of the ruling that should apply should a husband come across another 
man committing adultery with his wife and kill him, or her, or both of them.  There 
are two areas of law being discussed here. Firstly there is intentional homicide and the 
identification of situations in which qisas can be demanded by the heirs of the 
victim,24 the rulings on which are apart from any consideration of a ta`zir punishment 
imposed by the ruling authority. Secondly there is the crime of zina, which must be 
prevented if at all possible, since it is a hadd offence. Two further points regarding the 
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 For earlier Jordanian judicial application of this provision see Abu Odeh (supra note 13); for more 
recent developments, following the civil society campaign against ‘honour’ killings, see Abu Hassan 
and Welchman (supra note 9).  
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 See on this JND Anderson, ‘Homicide in Islamic law,’ Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African 
Studies 13/4 (1951): 811-828. 
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crime of zina in classical jurisprudence are raised by the jurists’ discussions on this 
point. These are, first, the ruling that if a person who commits zina is (or has been) 
married (that is, is muhsan/a) the penalty is death by stoning, while the unmarried 
person (the non-muhsan) is liable to a hundred lashes;25 and second, the extremely 
high standard of evidence required to establish the crime of zina in a manner that will 
render the perpetrator liable to the hadd penalty. This comprises ‘the concurring 
testimonies of four male eyewitnesses.’26 Noel Coulson explains further: 
In the case of most criminal offences two witnesses suffice. But the 
burden resting upon the prosecution in a case of zina is doubly severe. 
Four witnesses must testify orally. They must be male, adult Muslims. 
They must be thoroughly trustworthy – not merely in the sense that they 
must have no criminal record: scrutiny must show them to be men of 
unblemished integrity of character. Finally, they must testify to nothing 
less than their own individual clear eyewitness of the carnal act itself.27 
Coulson goes on to comment that ‘[t]he circumstances of a couple convicted 
upon such evidence must surely constitute the most graphic definition of the Latin 
maxim: “apprehended in flagrante delicto”.’ In the absence of such a ‘public’ 
offence, the only other way for zina to be proven in order to provoke the hadd penalty 
is the perpetrator’s fourfold confession in court. Asifa Quraishi explains the ‘nearly 
insurmountable evidentiary restrictions’ placed on prosecution of zina liable to the 
hadd penalty  as indicating that ‘the crime is therefore really one of public indecency 
rather than private sexual conduct’:  
                                                 
25
 See Peters (2005): 61 on the status of muhsan in Sunni law: adult, free, Muslim and having 
‘previously enjoyed legitimate sexual relations in matrimony (regardless of whether the marriage still 
continues).’ For a more in-depth discussion see Mohamed El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic law: a 
comparative study’ (Indianapolis: American Trust Publications, 1982): 18-20.   
26
 Peters (2005): 14. 
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 Noel Coulson, ‘Regulation of sexual behaviour under traditional Islamic law,’ pp.63-68 in Afaf Lutfi 
Sayyid Marsot, Society and the Sexes in Medieval Islam (Malibu: Undena Publications, 1979): 65. 
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[W]hile the Qur’an condemns extramarital sex as an evil, it authorizes 
the Muslim legal system to prosecute someone for committing this crime 
only when the act is performed so openly that four people see them 
without invading their privacy.28 
Along with other scholars, Quraishi thus argues that the combination of the 
evidentiary restrictions and the harshness of the penalty go to deterrence of the ‘public 
aspects’ of such sexual conduct and the consequent protection of public morality.29 
This is given further weight by the jurists’ consensus that while in general ‘witnesses 
to hadd crimes are neither legally nor morally obliged to give testimony,’ in cases of 
alleged zina ‘it is even considered commendable not to notify the authorities or testify 
in court.’30 This preference for the ‘covering’ of the offence, keeping it out of the 
public sphere, is referred to in the Qadi al-Qudah’s intervention.  
As in the case of other offences, a discretionary punishment (ta`zir) may 
imposed for an act of zina that cannot be proven in accordance with the procedural 
requirements rendering the perpetrator liable to the hadd penalty. And also as in the 
case of other offences, the jurists insist that the hadd penalty for zina may be imposed 
only by the judge endowed with this authority by the ruling authority. The eleventh 
century Hanafi jurist Sarakhsi, for example, observes that if four upright witnesses 
testify that a certain person committed zina, and then someone deliberately kills the 
accused person before the judge has sentenced him to the hadd penalty, the killer 
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 Asifa Quraishi, ‘Her honor: an Islamic critique of the rape laws of Pakistan from a woman-sensitive 
perspective,’ 18 Michigan Journal of International Law (1996-1997): 287-320 at p.296 
29
 See for example Mohamed El-Awa (1982): 17. 
30
 Peters (2005): 13. See also Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1964): 198.  
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would be liable to qisas, since ‘testimony gives rise to nothing unless followed by 
judgement.’31 
As noted above, the discussions of the classical jurists that have a relevance to 
the current debates on modern statutory provisions invoked by ‘honour killings’ come 
when they consider the criminal liability of a man who kills his wife and/or her 
partner on finding them in the act of adultery. In his summary of the rulings of the 
four Sunni schools, `Abd al-Rahman al-Jaziri notes a difference of opinion as to 
whether or not a killing in such circumstances gives rise to the prospect of qisas: ‘a 
man finds another man with his wife in adultery, and he kills him, so is he [then] 
killed or not?’ 32 The majority of the jurists, continues al-Jaziri, held that a man may 
not kill either of the adulterous couple in such circumstances, and if he does so he is 
liable to qisas unless he can prove his defence, establishing that the adulterer was 
muhsan and proving the act of zina by four witnesses or the confession of the 
adulterer. The hadith on which the majority position was based is explained as 
seeking to avert the risks of deception that might otherwise arise: 
A man might invite another man into his house to do something and then 
kill him for a grudge, and lie that he had found him with his wife. Or a 
man might kill his wife in order to be rid of her for some reason, and then 
falsely claim that he found a man committing zina with her.33  
Apart from this majority position, al-Jaziri reports that the dominant opinion of 
the Hanbalis and Malikis was to avert penalty if the victim was muhsan and the 
husband was able to bring two witnesses to testify that he killed because of zina, 
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 Muhammad Ibn Ahmad al-Sarakhsi, Kitab al-mabsut (Misr: Matba`at al-Sa`adah, 1324/1906) 
Volume 9 p.62.  
32
 For a summary see `Abd al-Rahman al-Jaziri, Kitab al-fiqh `ala al-madhahib al-arba`a (Beirut: Dar 
al-kutub al-`ilmiyya n.d.), Vol.5, p.61.  
33
 Al-Jaziri (n.d.) 62. The hadith he cites is narrated by Abu Hurayra and begins with Sa`ad Ibn `Ubada 
asking the Prophet: ‘Do you consider that if I found a man with my wife, I should grant him a respite 
till I bring four witnesses?’  
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rather than four to establish the crime of zina as required by the majority. Earlier 
opinions attributed by al-Jaziri to ‘certain of the Successors’ held that the man would 
not in any event be liable to the death penalty for the murder, and might be pardoned 
if there were ‘pre-existing suspicions of the ill conduct of the wife, or if the dead man 
was known for committing zina’, or there was circumstantial evidence for the crime.34  
 
Post-classical developments 
The majority ruling summarised by al-Jaziri appears to have lost currency in 
post-classical jurisprudence.  In 1964, Joseph Schacht summed up the fiqh consensus 
on the lapse of criminal liability as follows: 
There is no liability for acts against a person who is not protected, whose 
blood is hadar (opposite of ma`sum, inviolable). […] There is further no 
liability, of course, for carrying out the death penalty, or for death caused 
by carrying out hadd or ta`zir punishments; also if a man surprises his 
wife or his female mahram in unlawful intercourse and kills her and/or her 
accomplice…35  
JND Anderson went a little further on this point, including addressing the 
rights of the state to act against the killer: 
Neither talion nor blood-wit are applicable where the victim is not a 
legally protected person (ma`sum). This term would include a harbi,36 an 
apostate from Islam, or one liable to the death penalty for illicit sexual 
relations […] In regard to all except the harbi, the killer is liable to 
punishment for having taken the law into his own hands and acted without 
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 Ibid p.62.  
35
 Schacht (1964): 184. 
36
 Schacht defines a harbi as ‘a non-Muslim who is not protected by a treaty’, ‘in a state of war’, an 
‘enemy alien.’ (ibid p.131). 
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the authority of the Ruler, but the normal legal incidents of homicide are 
none the less inapplicable.37  
How these two scholars of Islamic law came to give such an account of the 
juristic position despite – rather than because of – the consensus of the classical 
schools can perhaps be explained by subsequent, post-classical developments in the 
jurisprudence of Islamic criminal law. On this issue, some later scholars and 
legislators appear to have been considerably less stringent than the classical jurists. 
Uriel Heyd’s translation of the (probably) late 15th century Ottoman Criminal Code 
includes the following: 
If a person finds his wife somewhere committing fornication with 
[another] person and kills both of them together - provided he 
immediately calls people into his house and takes them to witness - the 
claims of the heirs of those killed shall not be heard in court.38 
Here we notice the attention given to the need to prove the defence to murder, 
taking the lesser burden of two witnesses to the killer’s subsequent statement, rather 
than four to the act of zina, with the heirs in this circumstance procedurally excluded 
from claiming qisas or diya for an unlawful killing. The provision does not stipulate a 
penalty for the killer to be imposed by the state, but nor does it expressly exclude one. 
Also of relevance is the following provision, again in Heyd’s rendition: 
If a woman is spoken ill of [as having secret and illicit relations] with a 
man [and people] see the two at a secluded spot and testify [to that effect] 
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the cadi shall chastise [them] and a fine [or: fines] for fornication shall be 
collected, as [mentioned(?)] before.39  
In this case, there is no question of the hadd, and indeed no requirement for 
any evidence of the act of zina whatsoever, yet the fine for zina may be imposed by 
reason of seclusion and suspicion and previous ‘ill-repute’ of the woman involved.40 
It should be noted that there is no consideration in the statute of exoneration should 
one or both of such a couple be killed, or a ruling that the heirs’ claims would not be 
heard in court should this occur; this is rather a matter of the judge chastising (ta`zir) 
individuals for social conduct not liable to the hadd penalty for zina.  Even in regard 
to this era of post-classical Ottoman statute therefore, current penal codes and judicial 
practice appear to go much further in contemplating an absence of liability. 
On the other hand, the rulings of Ottoman jurists are examined by  Colin 
Imber, who traces what he calls an ‘increasing confidence’ over the 12th – 16th 
centuries in ‘a rule which gives – especially males – the right to kill a female in the 
same family and her lover, if he catches them in flagrante.’41 Examining a fatwa by 
Ebu’s-su`ud, the sixteenth century Mufti in Istanbul, he finds that this had developed 
to the position that ‘the men and senior women in a family may kill a female family 
member and a man who is not a close relative, if they find the two associating in any 
way.’ Imber’s comment is as follows: 
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It is not a classical Hanafi doctrine, but it is nevertheless one that 
emerges logically from the laws of fornication. The Hanafi tradition treats 
fornication as a heinous crime but, at the same time, renders prosecution 
impossible. A consequence of this is to remove the punishment of 
fornication from the public to the private sphere, making it the 
responsibility of the female offender’s family. However, the real source of 
post-classical Hanafi doctrine that allows the private punishment of 
fornicators seems to be the customary law of the Islamic world, the jurists 
having assimilate the popular ‘code of honour’ to formal legal practice.’42 
Thus, the argument is that the establishment muftis had moved away from the 
classical consensus against taking the law into one’s own hands in the specific 
circumstance of alleged or suspected sexual offences by a female member of the 
family. On the other hand, away from the sphere of very public fatwa-giving at the 
highest echelons of the Ottoman establishment (that is, parallel to the legislators) 
there remained local juristic resistance to any idea of family members enforcing 
norms of sexual morality through acts of violence. Writing on private muftis in 16th 
and 17th century Ottoman Syria and Palestine, Judith Tucker notes that they 
‘repeatedly lamented and condemned the prosecution and punishment of sexual 
offences by family members’: 
In denying family members, specifically a husband or a brother, any 
defined role in the punishment of women for sexual crimes, the muftis were 
adhering to the doctrine that unlawful sexual intercourse was a crime 
against religion, not an offence against one’s relatives. […] The muftis took 
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a clear position here against social customs that assigned fathers, brothers, 
and husbands the role of enforcer of female sexual behaviour.43 
This is very much the position taken by those at the top of the shar`i 
establishment in current-day Palestine, as the Chief Justice’s intervention shows; the 
classical consensus is invoked against certain social practice that, on Imber’s 
evidence, was accommodated by certain prominent post-classical jurists while being 
resisted by local practitioners. However, it should be noted that the fatwas on which 
Imber draws for his conclusion do not indicate endorsement of a killing perpetrated 
outside the context of a ‘suspicious situation’ or ‘association’ of a female suspected of 
having engaged in an illicit relationship.  That is, the idea that an act of murder could 
take place without liability in isolation from the alleged illicit act (in terms of time 
and place) does not appear: the couple have to be caught ‘in the act’ – even if the act 
is ‘illicit association’ rather than actual fornication. The jurisprudential discussions do 
not cover defences of ‘extreme rage resulting from an unrightful and dangerous act’ 
(as in the above-cited Article 98 of the Jordanian Penal Code) on the basis of which 
contemporary ‘honour killings’ are liable to be defended in the West Bank; rage, 
provocation and other such defences are not part of the classical jurisprudence. 
The criminal liability of a man who kills a woman – particularly a wife –
caught in the act of adultery has equally preoccupied other legal systems. This fact of 
comparative law has direct relevance for the arguments made by the Qadi al-Qudah 
in the intervention translated below. Tracing the development of English law on the 
defence of sexual provocation, Ian Leader-Elliot notes that in the nineteenth century  a 
man would have a defence against a murder charge if he caught his wife in the act of 
having illicit sex:  ‘[t]he killing had to be an immediate response to catching the 
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adulteress in the act. There was an absolute requirement of ‘ocular inspection,’ as it 
was called…’44 Leader-Elliot goes on to examine how these stricter evidentiary 
requirements for a successful defence were relaxed in subsequent judicial practice, in 
the development of a ‘steadily widening conception of provocation.’45 French 
legislation for its part showed a close resemblance to the statutory provisions that 
emerged in different Arab states in the twentieth century. Lama Abu-Odeh has 
examined this point in some detail, comparing the French Penal Code of 1810 and the 
later Ottoman Criminal Code of 1858, both of which granted the killer exemption 
from penalty if his wife or female relative was caught in the act of illicit fornication, 
and a reduction in penalty if she was caught (respectively) in a ‘suspicious situation’ 
or an ‘unlawful bed.’46 Earlier scholars did not pay similar attention to these 
comparative paradigms and statutes. Writing in 1975, Herbert Liebesny opens his 
chapter on contemporary criminal law in the Middle East as follows:  
In most Near and Middle Eastern countries modern penal codes have been 
enacted which follow generally the continental European system. […] In 
some instances, particularly where family honour is involved, local 
customs have, however, been taken into account, either by statutes or by 
the courts. Syria and Lebanon are examples of countries with statutory 
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provisions, which in this case are identical. […] In Iraq where the 
Baghdad Penal Code, in force until 1969, did not contain a comparable 
provision, executive clemency was used for a long time to shorten 
sentences imposed by the courts in cases where homicide was committed 
in the protection of family honour.47 
 Liebesny here seems unaware of the historical antecedents in the law and 
practice of the Mandatory powers (France and Britain) under whose rule and 
according to whose model these law and practices took shape. French law was the 
historical basis for the Lebanese and thence the Syrian penal codes. The statutory 
provisions Liebesny cites from Lebanon and Syria in the above passage are the ‘in 
flagrante’ articles that as noted above have precedents not only in Ottoman but also in 
French legislation, grating impunity or reduced liability if a man finds his wife or 
female relatives in the act of illicit sexual intercourse or other compromising 
situation.48 As for Iraq, the 1969 Iraqi Penal Code that replaced the British-issued 
Baghdad Penal Code did include a provision similar to those of Lebanon, Syria and 
Jordan.49 The ‘executive clemency’ exercised before this – starting under British 
Mandate rule – might perhaps be compared to the ‘grave and sudden provocation’ 
defence which was applied in the courts of British-ruled India and continued in the 
courts of Pakistan in cases of ‘honour killings’ where – to the dismay of rights 
activists – it is still successfully invoked, even after the ‘Islamisation’ of criminal law 
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and the formal removal of such defence.50 A defence of ‘grave and sudden 
provocation’ more closely evokes ‘extreme anger’ at an ‘unrighteous and dangerous 
act’ or other such formulations of a general provocation defence (also to be found in 
French law) that appear in the penal codes of different Arab states and, as noted 
above, provide grounds for the defence in cases of the contemporary paradigmatic 
‘honour killing.’ In sum, this does not mean that ‘local custom’ was not a source for 
the laws and practice that Liebesny cites – or at least, the part of local custom that the 
legislators, judiciary and political (including colonial) rulers chose to recognise. It 
does mean however that the matter is by no means as ‘local’ as Liebesny presents it, 
nor yet as particular to the Middle East.  And this can be critical for resistance and 
advocacy for change. 
 
Statement by the Chief Islamic Justice 
The ruling on murder as revenge (tha’r) or in defence of honour 
Shaykh Taysir Rajab al-Tamimi51 
 
 Unlawful sexual intercourse (zina) is one of the ugliest crimes committed 
against morality and virtue, undermining the social edifice and threatening 
family security and stability, impacting negatively on the upbringing of 
children and the formation of their personalities. It is one of the seven major 
sins prohibited by all divine religions; God said: ‘Nor come not nigh to 
adultery, for it is a shameful (deed) and an evil, opening the road (to other 
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evils).’ 52 And for this reason God Almighty punished it severely: ‘And the 
woman and the man guilty of adultery or fornication, flog each of them with a 
hundred stripes; let not compassion move you in their case, in a matter 
prescribed by God, if you believe in God and the Last Day.’53.  
 But Islam does not establish its rule on the penalty, but rather on 
preventing the reasons motivating the crime, and these are the sure guarantees 
to keep society clear of it, to refine the mind and keep the conscience clean, 
and to adhere to rules set for the natural disposition by marriage, and the rules 
regarding dress and beautification (especially as far as women are concerned), 
and to observe social and behavioural manners. 
 The basic (rule) in a crime such as this is that a person ‘cloaks’54 his own 
person and other people, in preservation of the dignity, cohesion and morality 
of society. However, if such a crime is taken before the ruler (hakim) then he 
has to carry out the hadd on the perpetrator: as the Prophet said (peace be 
upon him), ‘Forgive the hudud before you bring them to me, for the hadd that 
is brought before me becomes binding…’ (narrated by al-Nasa’i). And even if 
it is brought to the ruler, he must try to find a way out, to exert effort to avert 
the occurrence of the hadd penalty: ‘Avert the hudud from the Muslims as far 
as you can, and if there is a way out for someone then let him go, for it is 
better for the imam to err in forgiveness than to err in the penalty.’ (narrated 
by Tirmidhi) 
 The incidence of this crime is extremely difficult to prove definitively. 
The shari`a is very strict on this matter and allows it to be proved only in one 
of two ways: either through acknowledgement made voluntarily and without 
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coercion by the adult and sane perpetrator, man or woman; or through the 
testimony of four trustworthy adult witnesses, provided that the four 
testimonies accord with each other and describe the act exactly in explicit 
expressions. This means that the perpetrators of zina must have done it in 
such a wanton and unrestrained, public manner that people witnessed it, and 
this is why a heavy penalty is prescribed, to be carried out in front of people: 
‘And let a party of the believers witness their punishment.’55  However, if 
there are not enough witnesses, or their statements do not accord, all the 
witnesses are liable to the penalty for qadhf, and that is eighty stripes, so that 
the sanctity of good repute is not violated or wrongfully transgressed.  
 Other than this, the crime is not established against anyone; the Prophet 
said, in regard to a woman who had divorced from her husband by li`an after 
she gave birth to a child looking like the [man] accused [of being her partner 
in adultery], ‘if I had had anyone stoned without proof, I would have had this 
one stoned…’ (narrated by Bukhari). 
 And it is a requirement for a person liable to a hadd penalty that the 
perpetrator of the crime be adult, sane, and acting voluntarily, and if these 
conditions are not met then there can be no hadd imposed, especially if there 
is coercion. He said, ‘God has passed over among my people the mistaken, 
the forgetful, and the one who was coerced’ (narrated by Ibn Maja).  
 The shar`i texts hold that if the adulterer is a bikr who has not been 
married by valid contract then the hadd for the crime of unlawful sexual 
intercourse is a hundred lashes, while if he is muhsan and has been validly 
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married then the hadd is stoning, with no difference in this between men and 
women. 
 And the scholars (`ulama) agree that the hudud are the right of God 
Almighty and a defence of society, and that nobody – whoever they may be – 
apart from the ruler may cause the hadd to occur. It is the judiciary that 
examines the crime, according to procedure, and if the accused is found to 
have committed it and the judge rules that the hadd is due, then the ruler or 
the person he has delegated for that purpose is the only one allowed to carry it 
out on the accused. The same applies to qisas (exact retaliation) and all other 
hudud and offences and crimes; no individual in society is permitted to take 
the law into their own hands lest this lead to chaos, oppression and killing 
among the people on claims of taking revenge or avenging family honour. 
 The `ulama also agree that if a man finds another man with his wife, and 
establishes they have committed an immoral act, he may not kill this man; if 
he kills him, he is liable to [be killed in] retaliation (qisas), unless he 
establishes proof for his claim [that they were committing adultery] by 
bringing four witnesses. Verses in Surat al-Nur were revealed regarding li`an 
between spouses and not killing, for lack of witnesses. God Almighty said: 
‘As for those who accuse their wives but have no witnesses except 
themselves; let the testimony of one of them be four testimonies, [swearing] 
by God that he is of those who speak the truth; and yet a fifth, invoking the 
curse of God on him if he is of those who lie. And it shall avert the 
punishment from her if she bear witness before God four times that the thing 
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he says is indeed false, And a fifth [time] that the wrath of God be upon her if 
he speaks the truth.’ (Surat al-Nur verses 6-9).56    
 Sa`id bin al-Musib narrated that a man in Syria found a man with his wife 
and killed them both and Mu’awiya (may God be content with him) wrote to 
Abu Musa al-Ash`ari to ask Ali about this, and Ali (may God be content with 
him) said that if he didn’t bring four witnesses, he should be killed. 
 But society is characterised by complete tyranny when it comes to its 
attitude towards the crime of zina. There is no penalty for a woman who is 
coerced into zina or a girl who is raped, as they are overwhelmed against their 
will. And yet they are killed, in ignorance or in violation of the rulings of the 
shari`a, and in falling under the force of tribalism and pagan (jahili) zeal. A 
woman was forced [to commit zina] during the time of the Prophet (peace be 
upon him) and the hadd was averted and imposed on the person who had 
assaulted her (Ibn Maja). Abu Musa al-Ash`ari said that they brought to 
`Umar ibn al-Khattab (may God be content with him) a woman they said had 
committed fornication; she said that she had been asleep and had woken up to 
find a man on top of her, and `Umar let her go and told her guardian to treat 
her kindly. [But in the cases I am talking about here] the attacker goes 
without penalty, as does the killer, he is socially and legally safe from 
punishment. This is despite the fact that the motivation for the crime is an 
exacerbating circumstance that should increase the penalty with the liability 
of qisas, rather than reduce it as is the case with the Penal Code provision 
taken from European laws. God said: ‘Whoso deliberately slays a believer, 
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his reward is hell for ever. God is in wrath against him and he has cursed him 
and prepared for him an awful doom.’ (Al-Nisa’ verse 93). 
 Murder of this type is a wrongful aggression against a protected soul; God 
Almighty said ‘Slay not the life which Allah has forbidden save with right.’ 
(Al-Isra’ 33). The Prophet (peace be upon him) said ‘it is easier for God that 
the world should cease than that a believer be killed without right’ (narrated 
by Ibn Maja). It is a relic from the Jahiliya and its void customs that Islam 
fought against because of its oppression of women, and a violation of the 
rulings of the shari`a, which treated men and women equally in responsibility 
on this, the texts addressing both men and women without difference on the 
obligation to follow the guarantees that prevent the incidence of this crime, 
the need to avoid it, and the liability of each of them to the hadd, without 
distinction, should the crime be perpetrated.  
 And the uglier crime is that she is usually killed on the basis of suspicion 
of something she didn’t do. The Prophet said (peace be upon him) ‘If I had 
stoned anyone without proof, I’d have stoned the woman so-and-so, such was 
the doubt raised by what she said, how she looked, who went to see her’ 
(narrated by Ibn Maja). This is clear evidence that it not permitted to inflict 
the hadd for an allegation and that suspicion does not make it lawful to spill 
people’s blood. 
 Therefore, and in order to realise justice and ensure protection, we urge 
the Legislative Council to speed up its promulgation of the Penal Code and 
include in it the penalty of qisas for the crime of murder on the pretext of 
honour. 
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Comment 
The first point to note about this intervention is the title: ‘the ruling on murder 
as revenge (tha`r) or in defence of honour.’ The connection is practical, given the 
spate of inter-familial killings and the apparent rise in ‘honour killings’ witnessed in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2005, as noted at the beginning of this paper.  
However, the connection is also ideological and doctrinal, situating both types of 
killing outside the framework of lawful killing under the terms of classical Islamic 
jurisprudence. Scholars interpreted the Qur’anic rules on liability for murder as 
aiming to end pre-Islamic practices of feud and revenge killings, moving from the 
concept of tha’r to the institutionally sanctioned and highly constraining framework 
of qisas.57 The emphasis of the chronologically pre-Islamic origins of tha`r in the title 
shifts in the text to ascribe a doctrinally anti-thetical (anti-Islamic) nature to ‘honour 
killings’: thus women are killed by people ‘falling under the force of tribalism and 
pagan zeal’ and honour killings are ‘a relic from the Jahiliya and its void customs that 
Islam fought against because of its oppression of women…’  
The text itself opens with seven paragraphs on the classical doctrine on zina. 
This is the point of entry to the argument against the killing of women for alleged 
sexual misconduct; although zina is not the subject in the title of the ruling, because 
the preoccupation is with the sexual conduct of women, and the ‘honour’ defence is 
directly related to allegations of unlawful sexual conduct, the Qadi al-Qudah 
addresses this part of the jurisprudence before coming on to his main subject. Starting 
with the reasons for the prohibition of zina – the protection of the family and broader 
society – he then notes the severity of the punishment prescribed in the Qur’an 
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(flogging) before explaining that the ‘rule of Islam’ is based not on the penalty but 
rather on deterrence, on avoiding circumstances that could encourage the offence 
through modesty and clean-living among the members of society. This is pursued in 
the third paragraph where he invokes the principle of satr, of not revealing the 
offence, on the grounds discussed by Quraishi above – that is, protection of the public 
interest. The hadiths he cites in support of this point stress the need to avoid infliction 
of the hadd penalty wherever possible, while in the following paragraph, dealing with 
the difficulties involved in proving the offence beyond doubt, he goes back to the 
‘public’ nature of the crime liable to hadd:  if the evidential requirements are in fact 
met, the perpetrators ‘must have done it in such a wanton and unrestrained, public 
manner that people witnessed it’. Suspicion is not a basis for proof; and the offence of 
qadhf, wrongful accusation of zina, is there ‘so that the sanctity of good repute is not 
violated or wrongfully transgressed.’ These points, all taken from the classical 
sources, are addressing the specific context: at the end of the intervention, the Qadi 
al-Qudah comes back to the point that the victim of an ‘honour killing’ is ‘usually 
killed on the basis of suspicion of something she didn’t do.’ Further points made in 
these opening paragraphs also go directly to the context of ‘honour killings’ in which 
the intervention is made: that coercion is an absolute defence (as in the case of the girl 
whose murder most immediately prompted his statement) and that under classical 
Islamic law, the penalties for zina apply equally to men and women (whereas in 
‘honour killings’ the murder victim is nearly always female). 
Shaykh Tamimi then embarks on a vigorous assertion of the role of the 
judiciary: no-one is allowed to take the law into their own hands ‘lest this lead to 
chaos, oppression and killing among the people on claims of taking revenge or 
avenging family honour.’ In the context in which he was writing, with wide public 
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concern at the ‘security chaos’ and breakdown in law and order, including family 
feuds, this point has immediate relevance. The following paragraph invokes the 
classical jurisprudential consensus on the liability to qisas of a man who finds his wife 
committing adultery; there is no reason here to discuss dissenting opinions or post-
classical developments.  
The entry point, the focus on the venality of the act of zina and its dangers to 
society, is both doctrinal and strategic. The Qadi al-Qudah first upholds the principles 
of lawful sexual conduct and a moral society before proceeding to condemn acts 
justified by some as combating immoral behaviour. Local rights activists have to deal 
with the same context, which may be exacerbated by the perceptions that campaigns 
against honour killings, and for changes in statutes accommodating them, are fuelled 
and funded ‘from outside’, from Western donors and feminist organisations. Here the 
local context includes widespread perceptions of immorality endemic in current 
Western society combined with the dissipating potential of a hostile Western agenda 
of cultural imperialism along with economic and military aggression in the region, 
and a failure to challenge in any meaningful way the violence of the Israeli 
occupation.58 In the case that had been the immediate cause of the Qadi al-Qudah’s 
intervention, there was no doubt of the victim’s innocence of any act of consensual 
extra-marital sex, and when he comes to the ‘complete tyranny’ of modern-day 
society in dealing with sexual offences, the Qadi al-Qudah focuses his intervention 
specifically on cases of rape and coercion. The killing of such women is un-Islamic: it 
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is ‘in violation of the rulings of the shari`a’ and is a relic of ‘tribalism’ and of pre-
Islamic times. Illustrating his point with hadiths and the Qur’an, Shaykh Tamimi 
insists that this is wrongful killing of a protected soul, and reminding his readers of 
the stand of Islam against the ‘void customs of the Jahiliyya’ that Islam ‘fought 
against because of its oppression of women’. He recalls again the principle of equal 
liability of men and women, and returns to the theme of suspicion: firstly, baseless 
suspicion and the killing of those entirely innocent of the offence, and then the 
procedural principle that even apparently well-grounded suspicion provides no basis 
for the taking of a life. 
 In such points, the Qadi al-Qudah is doing what rights activists in Palestine 
and across the region have called on establishment figures in different religions to do, 
setting out why and how ‘honour killings’ are unlawful in their respective doctrines.59 
In the case of Islamic law, what is appealed to is the ‘classical’ doctrine with a focus 
on the ‘lawful’ state-imposed penalty for unlawful sexual conduct (the hadd), and the 
unlawfulness – and indeed, sinfulness – of other or extra-judicial penalties. That said, 
for women’s and human rights activists, the invocation of classical Islamic law 
principles is limited. Those engaged in advocacy efforts in Palestine and elsewhere to 
stop the occurrence of honour killings do not endorse calls for a full application of the 
dominant classical Islamic law interpretations – notably, the implementation of the 
hadd penalties for unlawful sexual relations. They may invoke the classical Islamic 
rules in order to discount claims of lawfulness of violent response by private actors, 
but they do not endorse the prospect of the violence of the state in relation to the 
sexual conduct of citizens. Nor, for that matter, does the Chief Islamic Justice call for 
this here. The statement at the beginning of the intervention, that ‘Islam does not 
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establish its rule upon the penalty’, could be read as holding that the mark of an 
‘Islamic society’ is not that it has hadd legislation in place, but that it conducts its 
affairs in such a manner as to ‘prevent the reasons motivating the crime.’ Unlike 
certain other establishment `ulama’ asked to pronounce on this issue, the Qadi al-
Qudah makes no criticism of the Palestinian legal system for not contemplating the 
introduction of hadd provisions, nor does he hint at any compassion to be exercised in 
favour of those who take the law into their own hands in the absence of hadd-based 
regulation of sexual relations by the state. His stand here is one of uncompromising 
censure of those who commit violence against women in the name of ‘honour.’60  
However, like rights activists, the Chief Islamic Justice does have demands to 
make on role of the state in demanding the protection of women from violence at the 
hands of private actors. In his address to the Palestinian Legislative Council at the end 
of the intervention, Shaykh Tamimi does make an appeal for the inclusion of classical 
Islamic law principles in applicable statutory law– not to the hadd for zina, but to 
qisas liability for the perpetrators of ‘honour killings’. The ‘motivation for the crime’ 
of ‘honour killing’, he asserts, is an ‘exacerbating circumstance that should increase 
the penalty with the liability of qisas, rather than reduce it as is the case with the Penal 
Code provision taken from European laws.’  
There are two points to be made here. The first is the reference to the 
European origins of the relevant provision of the existing Penal Code. This 
description probably refers to the in flagrante rules of article 340 of the Jordanian 
Penal Code currently applicable in the West Bank, although it might also apply to the 
‘extreme anger at an unrightful act’ of article 98, as discussed above. Both articles 
stand to reduce the penalty applicable to a man perpetrating an ‘honour crime’, in 
                                                 
60
 His only concession is the implication (in the second paragraph) that as private actors women are 
more responsible than men in regard to the way they dress and present themselves, in the interests of 
public morality. 
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various circumstances. The Qadi al-Qudah’s allusion has immediate resonance with 
similar features in the women’s rights discourse in the region, stressing non-
indigenous origins of the relevant statutory provisions in order to undermine claims 
that such provisions reflect authentic Arab (as compared to Islamic) legal heritage, as 
is claimed by those opposing statutory changes. Strategically this seeks to turn the 
tables on those who claim that attempts to change these statutory provisions are 
proposed by ‘agents of the West’ to undermine Arab society. While Western attention 
has tended to localise and essentialise the various phenomena of ‘honour crimes’ – 
and legal provisions accommodating them - to the Arab/Muslim/’Eastern’ contexts, 
the interventions and advocacy efforts of local groups have, inter alia, stressed the 
Western origins of statutory provisions contemplating a permissive attitude to the 
killing of women. 
 Secondly, in his call for the increase in penalty for perpetrators of ‘honour 
killings’ through the liability of qisas, the Chief Islamic Justice is setting the Islamic 
doctrine of retaliation for intentional and unlawful killing in apposition to the 
reduction in penalty provided for under current statutory law. So far from being 
‘justified’ or ‘lawful’, and provoking reduced liability or none at all, the invocation of 
the liability of qisas locates an ‘honour killing’ as a crime and a sin in the politically 
and doctrinally resonant language of the classical doctrine. There is of course no 
statutory doctrine of qisas in the current law; and moreover, under the classical rules, 
qisas would not be applicable in many cases of ‘honour killings’- for example, where 
a father kills his daughter, or where the victim’s heirs agree to waive the right to 
demand qisas.61  Is the Qadi al-Qudah making this call on the Palestinian legislature 
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 For how the 1990 Law of Qisas and Diyat has affected the treatment of perpetrators of ‘honour 
killings’ in Pakistan, see Warraich (2005):  
85-87. The penal codes in various Middle Eastern states, while not legislating on qisas, do allow the 
court to further reduce the sentence in the event that the close relatives of the murder victim waive their 
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in the expectation that the inclusion of the liability of qisas would underline the 
gravity of the offence, in ‘shar`i`’ as well as in ‘legal’ terms, even though it would be 
unlikely to be applied? Or is he suggesting that perpetrators be statutorily liable to the 
death penalty as in certain other cases of intentional murder? Either way, while 
wishing to see ‘honour’-based killings of women treated for all intents and purposes 
as other cases of intentional murder, rights activists are more likely to call for the 
constraint or abolition of the death penalty than to endorse calls for the expansion of 
capital punishment liability, however symbolic and whatever the motives of the Qadi 
al-Qudah.  
                                                                                                                                            
‘personal right’ or personal claim to compensation from the perpetrator. For the impact of the waiving 
of such personal claims by the families of victims of ‘honour killings’ in Jordan and Lebanon, see 
respectively Abu Hassan and Welchman (2005): 206, and Hoyek, Sidawi and Mrad (2005): 127. 
